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PRISONS-Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974).
Robert Martinez and Wayne Earley attacked one of the last
bastions of unfettered mail 'censorship in the United States-the
prison mail system.' The two inmates initiated a class action 2 on
behalf of themselves and all other persons subject to the California
Department of Corrections' Rules, challenging the constitutionality
of the regulations promulgated by Director of Corrections R. K.
Procunier, restricting an inmate's mail.3 The Director's Rules proMartinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Cal. i973).
2 The vehicle for their claim was the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.

(1970). Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The statute
provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
For an examination of the background and past applications of the statute see Note,
Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of FederalRights, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 839 (1964);
Note, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983: An Emerging Vehicle of Post-Conviction Relieffor State Prisoners, 22
U. FLA. L. REv. 596 (1970). The other principal means of securing judicial review of prison
grievances is an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1970).
Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23
STAN. L. REv. 473, 504 (1971).
A section 1983 action is generally preferred in prison cases because of the broad
interpretation it has been given over the years, most notably in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 183 (1961). In Monroe, the Court read section 1983 as providing a federal remedy,
"supplementary" to state remedies, for violations of an individual's constitutional rights by
anyone acting "under color of state law." Id. But see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973), where the Court rejected the use of section 1983 when the relief sought would lead
to a speedier release. The Preiser Court held that the sole federal remedy available to a
prisoner challenging the duration of his imprisonment is a writ of habeas corpus. 411 U.S. at
500.
The popularity of section 1983 is attributable to many factors. There is no need to
exhaust state remedies, administrative or judicial. Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 417
(1967); Monroe v. Pape, supra at 183. Additional benefits are that discovery is available; class
actions are possible; and equitable remedies such as injunctions are provided. Turner,
Federal Jurisdiction and Practice in Prisoner Cases, in PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCE BOOK 243,

244-46 (M. Hermann & M. Haft eds. 1973).
3 Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1973). See STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CORREC-

(1971) [hereinafter referred to as Director's Rules]. For the purposes of this note the.
term "legal" mail will be used to designate mail to and from prisoners and the courts,
attorneys, and public officials. Mail of a personal, non-legal nature will be classified as
"personal" mail.
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hibited inmates from agitating, unduly complaining or magnifying
grievances in their correspondence.4 Furthermore, inmates could
neither send nor receive letters containing " 'foreign matter' " or
which were " 'otherwise inappropriate.'
Certain writings could be
declared "contraband," and the possession of contraband was
6
grounds for disciplinary action.
In addition to their attack on the mail regulations, the inmates
challenged the validity of a rule severely limiting the use of law
students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates. 7 The regulation limited to two the number
of investigators an attorney-of-record could use, and required that
all investigators be licensed by the state or members of the state
bar.8 In application, this rule amounted to an "absolute ban" on an
"5

4 Director's Rule 1201 provided:

INMATE BEHAVIOR. Always conduct yourself in an orderly manner. Do not
fight or take part in horseplay or physical encounters except as part of the regular
athletic program. Do not agitate, unduly complain, magnify grievances, or behave
in any way which might lead to violence.
Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1973). This rule, which
appears to regulate activities unrelated to mail, was admittedly applied to personal correspondence. Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1804 n.2 (1974).
' Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (quoting from
Director's Rule 2402(8)).
6 Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1095-96 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Director's Rule D
1205d provided that contraband consisted of
"[a]ny writings or voice recordings expressing inflammatory political, racial,
religious or other views or beliefs when not in the immediate possession of the
originator, or when the originator's possession is used to subvert prison discipline
by display or circulation .. "
Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (quoting from
Director's Rule D 1205d). The rule also provided for confiscation of "contraband," which
could then be turned over to the California Adult Authority, which decides whether and
when to grant parole. Appellants' Brief, Exhibit C at v-vi, Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct.
1800 (1974).
Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1093, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The inmates
originally presented five claims for the court's consideration, but the district court determined that they need not deal with three of them. Id. at 1094-95.
Count IV dealt with Director's Rule 2402(10). The court was informed at oral argument
that that rule, which regulated an inmate's use of registered and certified mail, would be
omitted from the new revised regulations. Since the issue would soon be moot, the court
refrained from ruling on the regulation. 354 F. Supp. at 1094. Count V was an individual
claim Martinez asserted regarding abuse in the application of one of the Director's Rules.
The court determined that since the validity of the rule itself was not in question the issue
should be handled by a single judge district court. Id.
A third claim, attacking regulations restricting the content of correspondence between
inmates and attorneys, referred to as "legal mail," was declared moot on the basis of the
California supreme court's decision in In re Jordan, 7 Cal. 3d 930, 500 P.2d 873, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1972). 354 F. Supp. at 1095. In Jordan it had been determined that these same
regulations were void as "inconsistent with the intent of existing legislation." 7 Cal. 3d at
938, 500 P.2d at 878, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
8 Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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attorney's use of law students or legal paraprofessionals to conduct
attorney-client interviews. 9
Since the inmates sought to enjoin enforcement of these rules
on constitutional grounds, a three-judge district court was convened to consider their claims.' 0 The three-judge court found that
the mail regulations violated the first and fourteenth amendments
and were both vague and overbroad."t The limitations on law
students and paraprofessionals were also declared overbroad as
well as violative of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.1 2 In
granting the inmates' motion for summary judgment, 1 3 the court
enjoined enforcement of the challenged rules, ordered Procanier
to formulate new regulations for the court's approval, and retained
jurisdiction until new rules were submitted and approved. 4 While
the first proposed revisions of the Department's regulations were
9 Procunier v. Martinez, 94S. Ct. 1800, 1814 (1974). The Supreme Court characterized
the rule as creating an absolute ban. However, while law students and paraprofessionals
working for an attorney were banned, law students attached to a law school program were
routinely admitted to the prisons. Id. at 1815.
10 Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The court was
convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute .. . shall not be granted by any district court
or judge. thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless
the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges

Prison suits seeking to enjoin as unconstitutional the enforcement of a state statute, a
prison rule promulgated pursuant to a state statute, or an administrative regulation of
statewide application require a three-judge court. Turner, FederalJurisdiction and Practice in
PrisonerCases, in PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCE BOOK 243, 244-46 (M. Hermann & M. Haft eds.
1973).
For a discussion of the application of section 2281 in prison suits see Sands v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2403 (1974) (vacating and
remanding three prison cases for failure to convene a three-judge district court).
" Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1096-97 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The district
court also found that there were no standards to guide a guard in determining whether a
particular letter should be censored, or what form of disciplinary action, if any, should be
taken. Id. at 1095.
2 Id. at 1099.
13Id. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Procunier had moved to dismiss the inmate's
suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, an invitation to the
district court to adopt a "hands-off" position. 354 F. Supp. at 1093. See notes 20-22 infra and
accompanying text. The plaintiffs, in turn, moved for summary judgment. 354 F. Supp. at
1093.
14 Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The court's order
required that the new rules regarding prison mail censorship contain provisions for
minimum procedural safeguards. Id. at 1097. The court also suggested, without ordering,
that acceptable rules regarding investigators should contain provisions to allow bona fide law
students under the supervision of attorneys, or their full time lay employees, access to the
prisons. Id. at 1099.
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pending before the district court, Procunier appealed the court's
1 5
order.
The Supreme Court, in Procunier v. Martinez,16 affirmed the
district court's opinion, holding that rules allowing for censorship
of a prisoner's mail are justified only if they "further an important
or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression
of expression," and are no greater than necessary or essential to
protect that interest. 7 Furthermore, the Court ruled that any decision to censor a prisoner's mail must be accompanied by minimum
procedural safeguards.' 8 Finally, the ban on the use of law students
and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews
was held to be an unjustified restriction on an inmate's right of
access to the courts guaranteed by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.' 9
Traditionally, federal courts have taken a cautious approach to
prison litigation and have only reluctantly considered claims involving prisoners' rights.2 ° This policy of judicial restraint, termed the
"hands-off doctrine, "21 amounts to a denial of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of prisoners' complaints and precludes even a casual
5 Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1804 (1974).
16 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974).
'7 Id. at 1811-12.
18 Id. at 1814.
I9 Id. at 1814-15. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, set out a two-part
concurring opinion in which he argued that the first amendment rights of prisoners should
have been considered by the Court and "that prison authorities may not read inmate mail as
a matter of course." Id. at 1815. Furthermore, Justice Marshall maintained that an inmate's
right "to use the mails as a medium of free expression" is a "constitutionally guaranteed
right," and that reading of prisoners' mail could only be justified when prison authorities
have an exceptional need to do so. Id. at 1816-17.
Justice Douglas concurred in the majority opinion and joined in Part II of Justice
Marshall's opinion, stating that the first amendment is one of the "privileges and immunities
of all citizens" and that prisoners are still "persons" retaining all constitutional rights not
stripped from them by procedures satisfying the due process clause. Id. at 1818-19. Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined in this opinion. Id. at 1818.
2" See, e.g., Garcia v. Steel, 193 F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951) ("The courts have no
supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of the various [penal] institutions"); Dayton v.
Hunter, 176 F.2d 108, 109 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949) ("A court of equity

does not have power . . . to superintend . . . the conduct of a federal penitentiary or its

discipline").
This judicial reluctance to review prisoners' claims has not been limited to the federal
courts. In State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111, 297 A.2d 265 (1972), the Maryland court of
appeals reversed several lower court decisions on prison grievances, stating that "it is not the
function of the judiciary to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in the
State penal institutions." Id. at 129, 297 A.2d at 275. Accord, Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v.
Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 568, 168 A.2d 793, 794 (1961).
21 Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique ofJudicialRefusal to Review the Complaints
of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 506 & n.4 (1963).
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examination of the inmates' allegations. 2 Courts invoking the
hands-off doctrine are fond of quoting dictum from Price v.
Johnston2 3 in which Justice Murphy stated:
Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
24 justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system.
The ProcunierCourt explored the federal judiciary's rationales
for invoking the hands-off doctrine,2 5 stating that the fundamental
reasons for the doctrine are "the nature of the problems and the
efficacy of judicial intervention. '26 The Court also noted that the
problems of the nation's penal institutions are exceedingly complex and thus not susceptible to piecemeal resolution. 27 Furthermore, the comprehensive planning and resource allocation re22 Id. at 506-07. See Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 175, 181 (1970); Millemann, Protected Inmate Liberties: A CaseforJudicialResponsibility,
53 ORE. L. REV. 29, 35-36 (1973).
23 334 U.S. 266 (1948). See, e.g., Labat v. McKeithen, 361 F.2d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294, 295 (7th Cir. 1954).
24 334 U.S. at 285. One author has noted that Price had nothing to do with prison
officials' internal administrative power, but rather dealt with the court of appeals' power to
order a prisoner to appear before the court to argue his own appeal. Turner, Establishingthe
Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manualfor Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473, 508
(1971).
Courts rejecting the hands-off doctrine are equally fond of quoting the Sixth Circuit's
positive formulation of the same concept: " '[A] prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary
citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law.' " Moore
v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1972) (quoting from Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d
443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944)). Accord, Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1968).
25 94 S. Ct. at 1807. The Court referred to a Note outlining the various procedural
limitations on judicial activism in the area of prisons, such as the requirement under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 that deprivation of a constitutional right must be shown, and similar limitations on the writ of habeas corpus. 94 S. Ct. at 1807 (citing Note, Decency and Fairness: An
Emerging JudicialRole in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841, 843 (1971)). The net result of
these limitations is that the federal courts cannot prohibit a given practice unless it reaches
constitutional dimensions. Note, supra at 843-44. These procedural limitations, however,
rarely constitute the actual reason courts will not review prisoner grievances, since the
hands-off doctrine is most often invoked to avoid precisely the question of whether a
prisoner retains a particular constitutional right. Note, supra note 21, at 508.
One commentator has expressed the view that two unarticulated reasons behind the
hands-off doctrine are "the fear of exploding dockets, and a general hostility to prisoners as
a class of litigants." Millemann, supra note 22, at 37.
26 94 S. Ct. at 1807. The Court also suggested that considerations of comity and
federalism come into play when a federal court is asked to enjoin a state's penal practice. Id.
27 Id. Implicit in the Court's analysis of the hands-off doctrine was a consideration of
the familiar judicial rationales for avoiding a prisoner's complaint: (1) the concept of
separation of powers (see, e.g., Sawyer v. Sigler, 445 F.2d 818, 819 (8th Cir. 1971)); (2) the
feeling that the complex problems of prisons are beyond the scope of judicial expertise (see,
e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972));
(3) the fear of frustrating penal objectives such as discipline and internal control (see, e.g.,
McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964)). 94 S. Ct. at 1807.
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quired for effective prison administration are functions "peculiarly
28
within the province of the legislative and executive branches,
rather than the judiciary.
Stating that judicial recognition of the hands-off doctrine
"reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism," 29 the Court
nevertheless asserted that when a valid constitutional claim arises in
a prison setting the courts are compelled to intervene. 30 Since the
28 94 S. Ct. at 1807. Judge Tuttle, in his dissent in Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 672

(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972), responded to a similar statement by that
court's majority in the following manner:
For this court to tell the prisoner to look to the legislature and an administrator
who has condoned, and still excuses them, [deplorable prison conditions] would
seem to me but an empty gesture ....
One commentator has noted that the Court has not been reluctant to enter into other
fields equally complex and normally the particular function of the other branches of
government, such as state school systems. Stern, Prison Mail Censorship: A Nonconstitutional
Anaysis, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 995, 1000 (1972).
29 94 S. Ct. at 1807. Commentators have almost unanimously condemned the hands-off
doctrine. See, e.g., Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 22, at 179-82; Millemann, supra note 22, at
38-45; Stern, supra note 28, at 999-1000; Note, supra note 21, at 507-09. One author has
credited the doctrine with creating "lawlessness in the corrections phase of the criminal
process." Turner, supra note 24, at 473. But see Kimball & Newman, JudicialIntervention in
CorrectionalDecisions: Threat and Response, 14 CRIME & DELIN. 1, 4-5 (1968) (pointing out the
adverse effects that judicial intervention often have on corrections personnel); Prject-Judicial
Intervention in Corrections: The California Experience-An Empirical Study, 20 U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
452, 551-60 (1973) (accepting judicial intervention, but pointing out correctional officials'
hostility to the concept, and the need for limits to the judicial role).
Recent commissions charged with the responsibility of exploring the criminal justice
system have advocated the rejection of the hands-off doctrine. One such group has suggested that the courts assume broad authority, including coritinuous supervision over the
conditions of prisons. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS &
GOALS, REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, Standard 2.18, at 70 (1973). See ilso National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners, in ABA COMM. ON
CORRECTIONAL

FACILITIES

AND

SERVICES,

COMPENDIUM

OF

MODEL

CORRECTIONAL

IV-56 (1972).
30 94 S. Ct. at 1807-08. In Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964), the Court, for the
first time, made it clear that an inmate's allegation that restrictions placed upon his activities
are in violation of his constitutional rights, stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has frequently reiterated this position, stating that the standard to be applied
in dismissing a prisoner's complaint for failure to state a claim is the same as is applicable to
any other complaint; it must be "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957). See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); Hains v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972).
As a result of Cooper, lower courts slowly abandoned the hands-off doctrine and became
more receptive to the constitutional claims of inmates. Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the
First Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 87, 91-93 (1971). Cooper and its progeny, however, have never
been universally accepted by the lower courts. Consequently, prisoners have had to contend
with the hands-off doctrine, slowly building their bill of rights one by one. As each new right
became generally recognized as being retained by prisoners, the courts would reject the
hands-off position and hear the complaint on the merits. See Goldfarb & Singer, supra note
22, at 183-86; Millemann, supra note 22, at 36-37, 45.
LEGISLATION AND

STANDARDS
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district court held that the California mail regulations violated the
first amendment, 3 ' the prerequisite for discarding the hands-off
32
doctrine was satisfied.
Before considering the inmates' claims on their merits, the
Court was compelled to dispose of several arguments for abstention, a judicial theory closely akin to the hands-off doctrine and
often invoked by prison officials anxious to avoid judicial scrutiny
of their rules. 33 The Court met Procunier's abstention arguments
in summary fashion, 34 stating that when a statute is attacked as
facially repugnant to the first amendment, abstention is generally
not proper. 35 Furthermore, California had no statutes which could
be reasonably interpreted to "avoid or modify the federal constitutional question" presented and thus obviate the need for federal
36
intervention.
31 354 F. Supp. at 1096. The district court went so far as to declare the right to
correspond to be "fundamental." Id. at 1097.
32 While the hands-off doctrine has lost most of its vitality, its demise is far from
complete. See, e.g., Lamar v. Coffield, 353 F. Supp. 1081 (S. D. Tex. 1972). In its place some
courts have begun applying what has been termed the "modified hands-off approach."
Millemann, supra note 22, at 37. In application, the modified hands-off doctrine allows an
inmate to proceed beyond the threshold stage of jurisdiction; however, the court then simply
defers to the judgment of the prison officials and denies the relief requested. See, e.g., Sostre
v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
11 See, e.g., Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 479 (1970),
modified, 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014,
1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Turner, supra note 10, at 243.
34 94 S. Ct. at 1805-07. The lower court had rejected appellants' contention that it
should abstain on the basis of comity. 354 F. Supp. at 1094. The Supreme Court agreed,
noting that the mere possibility that a state court may declare a prison regulation unconstitutional is no grounds for abstention. 94 S. Ct. at 1805. Both courts cited Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), for this proposition. 94 S. Ct. at 1805; 354 F. Supp. at
1094-95. In Wisconsin, the Court stated that "abstention should not be ordered merely to
await an attempt to vindicate the claim in a state court." 400 U.S. at 439.
31 94 S. Ct. at 1807. See also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967); Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964). Appellants also argued that the district court's finding
that the Director's Rules were unconstitutionally vague " 'constitute[d] a compelling reason
for abstention.'" 94 S. Ct. at 1805 (quoting from Appellants' Brief at 8-9). The Court,
however, pointed out that "not every vagueness challenge to an uninterpreted state statute
or regulation constitutes a proper case for abstention." 94 S. Ct. at 1805. See, e.g., Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601 n.9 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, supra. Further, the
Court noted that the statutes had been stricken not only for vagueness, but also on first
amendment grounds. 94 S. Ct. at 1806.
36 94 S. Ct. at 1806-07. Appellants argued that CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600(4) (West 1970),
which provides for the receipt of newspapers, periodicals and books, could be interpreted by
the state courts in a manner which would eliminate the necessity of adjudication in a federal
court. 94 S. Ct. at 1806. The Court pointed out, however, that section 2600(4) has nothing to
do with personal mail. Id. at 1806-07.
The abstention doctrine is generally inapplicable in prisoner rights cases since there are
usually no state statutes that could be interpreted to avoid the constitutional issue. See
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Considering the question of mail censorship on the merits, the
Court articulated the issue before it as being "the appropriate
standard of review for prison regulations restricting, freedom of
speech. '3 7 The Court indicated that its purpose in deciding the
issue was not only to dispel the confusion surrounding restrictions
on prisoner mail which had contributed to haphazard protection of
first amendment interests and uncertainty on the part of correctional officials, but also to reduce what the Court deemed an
"unnecessar[y] ... involvement of the federal courts in affairs of
3 8s
prison administration.
The proper standard to apply to prison mail regulations has
been the subject of much litigation 3 9 and commentary.4" Lower
courts, in responding to attacks on prison regulations, have approached the issue in a variety of ways and with varying
standards. 41 Some have adopted the hands-off position, 4 2 or have
required only that the censorship be related to "any rational and
constitutionally acceptable concept of a prison system," the test
articulated in the influential decision of Sostre v. McGinnis.4 3 Other
courts have posed standards generally applicable to non-prison
settings, requiring that the state demonstrate a "compelling state
interest," a "clear and present danger," or a similarly high standard
44
to justify censorship.
Turner, supra note 10, at 246. For an explanation of the proper application of the abstention
doctrine see Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-37 (1965).
31 94 S. Ct. at 1808. The Court, however, did not deal with the full range of restrictions
on freedom of speech in a prison environment. Rather, it limited its review to restrictions on
mail, later restating its task as being "to formulate a standard of review for prisoner mail
censorship." Id.
38

Id.

39 For a compilation of the cases involving prison mail see

PRISON

LAw REPORTER,

PRISONERS' LEGAL RIGHTS BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CASES AND ARTICLES 5-9 (1974).
41 See, e.g., Brant, Prison Censorship Regulations versus The Constitution: An

Analysis, 19

LOYOLA L. REV. 25 (1972); Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 22; Jacob, Prison Discipline and
Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 227 (1970); Millemann, supra note 22;

Stern, supra note 28; Note, supra note 30; Note, supra note 21.
"' One author has characterized the variety of tests applied as "bewildering." Note,
supra note 30, at 93.
4" See, e.g., Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); McCloskey v. Maryland, 337
F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964).
43 442 F.2d 178, 199 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972). A similar
standard was articulated in Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g 340 F.
Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972), where the court rejected the lower court's compelling state
interest test in favor of what it termed the "rational relationship standard." 489 F.2d at 1343.
44 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1972) (clear and present
danger); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968) (substantial and controlling
interest); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (compelling
state interest).
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Recently, many lower courts have adopted a standard that falls
45
between the two extremes, the "reasonable and necessary" test.
This test, first employed in Carothers.v. Follette,46 requires that any
restrictions on
the right of free expression that a prisoner would have enjoyed if
he had not been imprisoned must be related both reasonably...
and necessarily .

.

. to 47
the advancement of some justifiable pur-

pose of imprisonment.

The Carothers court indicated that the only justifiable rationales for
restrictions on an inmate's mail were rehabilitation, prison security
and internal discipline.4 8
The varying approaches taken by the lower courts are attributable in part to the fact that the Supreme Court has never
determined whether the right to use the mails is one of the rights
that survives incarceration. 4 9 Lower courts, in searching for the
appropriate standard to apply, have therefore drawn distinctions
between purely personal mail, and mail related to some other,
independent, fundamental right. 50 For example, it was early established in Ex parte Hull51 that due process required that prisoners
must be allowed access to the courts and therefore a prisoner's
legal mail could not be screened to meet prison standards. 5 2 This
principle, while applied somewhat erratically, 53 has been extended
54
to apply to other officers of the court.
" See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 896 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Burham v.
Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880, 886 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
6 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Carothers, a prisoner was severely punished for
"'making derogatory and lying statements' " in a letter to his parents. Id. at 1021.
47 Id. at 1024 (footnote & citations omitted).
48 Id. at 1024-25.
49 A free citizen's first amendment right to use the mails has been firmly established.
See, e.g., Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.
301, 305 (1965). However, the lower courts have alost universally recognized that inmates
do not enjoy the same right to use the mails as free individuals, and that the unique nature
of a prison environment allows for some restrictions on the use of the mails. SOUTH
CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED 70-71 (1972).
5" See, e.g., Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965). It is now generally
recognized that prisoners fully retain the protections of the due process, equal protection,
cruel and unusual punishment, and free exercise clauses of the Constitution. See Note, supra
note 30, at 92. Unjustified restrictions on the exercise of these rights via the mails are
therefore invalidated by the courts. See Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 22, at 221-22.
51 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
52 Id. at 549.
53 See, e.g., Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1954) (upholding district
court's dismissal of a complaint alleging that prison officials refused to mail a letter relating
to the prisoner's pending appeal). See Stern, supra note 28, at 1012-16.
5" See, e.g., Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1972) (mail to attorney); Burns v.
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Similarly, in Cooper v. Pate,55 the Supreme Court ordered the
lower court to consider a prisoner's claim that he had been denied
free exercise of religion by prison officials.5 Part of the relief the
inmate sought was the right to communicate by mail with his
minister. 57 Since Cooper, prison officials have generally been required to meet a heavy burden of justification for restrictions on
5 8
mail of a religious nature.
The Procunier Court specifically rejected any analysis of
California's prison mail regulations from the viewpoint of prisoners' rights,5 9 thus avoiding the morass of prior decisions.6 0 Instead,
the Court approached the issue from the novel standpoint of the
rights of individuals who have "a particularized interest in communicating with [inmates]." '6' Recognizing that a free citizen's right
to use the mails without unjustified governmental interference is
grounded in the first and fourteenth amendments,6" the Court
determined that any restriction on a prisoner's "mail works a conSwenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), modifying 288 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (requiring
with limits, that correspondence with the ACLU be allowed). But see McCloskey v. Maryland,
337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964).
55 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
56 Id.

Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518, 521-22 (7th Cir. 1967).
F.2d 23, 24-25 (5th Cir. 1969); Theriault v.
Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375, 383 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 495
F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974).
59 94 S. Ct. at 1809.
60 The confusion revolving around the various standards applied by the lower courts
was enunciated by Judge Doyle, when he despaired:
I find virtually no guidance to a federal district court today in its effort to decide
whether the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to regulate the life of a
prisoner in [regard to mail censorship] ....
Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 548 (W.D. Wis. 1972) (footnote omitted), rev'd, 489
F.2d 1335 (1973), remanded, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
61 94 S. Ct. at 1809. This approach has not been applied by the lower courts in
analyzing prison mail except tangentially when the issue included freedom of the press and
the right of the press to gather information. See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545,
547-48 (1st Cir. 1971); Burham v. Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880, 885 (W.D.N.Y. 1972). But see
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 786 (D.R.I. 1970).
The Court indicated that its analysis did not apply to situations involving mass mailings.
94 S. Ct. at 1809 n. 11. The issue of mass mailings was considered in Goodwin v. Oswald, 462
F.2d 1237, 1242-45 (2d Cir. 1972), where the court upheld the lower court's decision
allowing a mass mailing from the Legal Aid Society regarding the formation of a prisoners'
union. See also Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
62 94 S. Ct. at 1809. The Court cited Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965), in support of this proposition. 94 S. Ct. at 1809. In Lamont, the Court heard a
challenge to the constitutionality of an act which required that the addressee of" 'communist
political propaganda' " notify the Postmaster General of his desire to receive the material.
381 U.S. at 302-03. The Court held the statute unconstitutional "as a limitation on the
unfettered exercise of the addressee's First Amendment rights." Id. at 305.
56 See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411
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sequential restriction on the . . . rights of those who are not
prisoners. '6 3 The Court made it clear that they were not dealing
with the concepts of the "'right to hear' ,,64 or third party
standing, 65 but rather with a form of communication where the
interest of the "parties are inextricably meshed. '6 6 Consequently,
the Court rejected any justification of censorship based upon notions of the rights of prisoners, and turned its attention to non67
prison decisions.
In its search for a standard to apply to prison mail regulations,
the Procunier Court first looked to cases arising from another institutional setting in which the interest of government and individuals often clash-the school system. 68 In considering infringements on the rights of students, the Court has recognized that first
amendment rights must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment. '69 Therefore, the Court has
balanced the legitimate needs of the school against the rights of the
individual to determine if restrictions on those rights are justified.
For instance, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,70 the Court weighed "the need for affirming the comprehensive authority . . . of school officials . . . to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools" against the first amendment rights
63 94 S. Ct. at 1809.

64 Id. The Court's reference here is apparently to that line of cases following Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), where the Court stated: "This [first amendment]
freedom embraces the right to distribute literature ... and necessarily protects the right to
receive it." Id. at 143 (citation omitted). See Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63
(1972), for a further explanation of the "right to hear" cases. While not embracing this
concept, some courts have discussed its application in a prison setting in regard to press
interviews with inmates. See, e.g., Burham v. Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880, 885 (W.D.N.Y.
1972).
65 94 S. Ct. at 1809. By specifically avoiding the "difficult question" of third party
standing, the Court left unanswered the question of how it was predicating its analysis on the
rights of individuals who were not parties to the suit. Id. Although the requirements of
standing are greatly relaxed in some first amendment cases, this technique of relying on
third parties' rights is unusual. Cf Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). In
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), which also dealt with mail restrictions,
Justice Brennan stated:
These might be troublesome cases if the addressees predicated their claim for
relief upon the First Amendment rights of the senders. To succeed, the addressees
would then have to establish their standing to vindicate the senders' constitutional
rights . ...

Id. at 307-08 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
66 94 S. Ct. at 1809.
67 Id. at 1808-09.
61 Id. at 1809-10.

69 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
70 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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of the students. 71 The balance tipped in favor of the students when
the school authorities were unable to justify their restriction against
wearing anti-war armbands as anything "more than a mere desire
to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany
72
an unpopular viewpoint.
Similarly, in Healy v. James, 73 the Court balanced a Connecticut
college's interest in avoiding campus disruptions against the students' free association right to form a local chapter of the Students
for a Democratic Society (SDS).74 The Healy Court examined the
college's justifications for refusing to recognize the students' group,
and found them lacking in substance, 75 indicating however that if
the college could demonstrate that recognition of the SDS would
disrupt the educational process, then a refusal of recognition
would be justified.

76

However, the case upon which the Procunier Court placed its
greatest reliance, United States v. O'Brien,7 7 arose from a factual
setting quite unlike the school cases. 7 8 In O'Brien the Court assessed
the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited the destruction
of "draft cards. '79 The defendant, who had burned his draft card
as a protest to the Viet Nam war, argued that the statute was
unconstitutional since it was enacted to abridge free speech, i.e., the
symbolic speech implicit in the act of burning one's draft card. 80 In
response, the Court enunciated a test to be applied in evaluating
71 Id. at 507.
72 Id. at 509.

13 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
74 Id. at 180-82.
71 Id. at 185-92. The college attempted to justify its refusal to recognize the students'
group on several grounds. However, the Court indicated that only two of the stated reasons
had any weight: the group might be disruptive, and the group was equivocal as to whether
or not it would abide by reasonable campus regulations. Id. at 188-91. The Court indicated
that in addition to the required showing of the existence of legitimate and substantial state
interest to support an infringement on first amendment rights, the state may need to show
that the restriction is no greater than essential. Id. at 189-90 n.20.
78 Id. at 188-89. Since a factual question remained regarding the students' willingness to
abide by the rules of the college, the Court remanded the case. Id. at 194.
17 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See 94 S. Ct. at 1810-11.
78 The Procunier Court readily admitted that these cases were not directly on point, a
school environment being qualitatively different from a prison setting, and O'Brien involving
a statute that on its face had no connection with freedom of speech. 94 S. Ct. at 1810.
However, the Court felt that "in broader terms" the cases were sufficiently analogous to the
instant case since they all involved restrictions on first amendment liberties by governmental
action unrelated to the suppression of expression. Id. at 1810-11.
19 391 U.S. at 370. See 50 App. U.S.C. § 462(b)(3) (1968).
80 391 U.S. at 370.
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the constitutionality of governmental regulations directed at
"nonspeech" activities which indirectly impinge on free speech:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest. 1

Adopting the substance of the O'Brien test,8 2 the Procunier
Court enunciated a two-part standard to be applied to censorship
of a prisoner's mail:
First, the regulation or practice in question must further an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression. . . Second, the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or
essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved.8 3

Application of this test necessarily requires an initial finding of
the legitimate governmental interests in a prison environment,
which the Court found to be rehabilitation, "the preservation of
internal order and discipline, [and] the maintenance of institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry. '' 84 Justification

of mail censorship as a rehabilitative measure, however, was all but
foreclosed by the Court, which noted that the weight of profes81

Id. at 377.

81 The test is more appropriately credited to Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960),

where the Court, in another school case, stated:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose.
Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted).
83 94 S. Ct. at 1811. Other courts have used the O'Brien test in their analysis of prison
mail restrictions. See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 548 (1st Cir. 1971). The
analogy between the school cases and prison mail censorship has been noted in SOUTH
CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED 70 (1972).
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the "less drastic means" portion of the test alone is
sufficiently inclusive and flexible to apply to prison mail censorship while serving the
interests of both the prisoners and administrators. Note, supra note 30, at 94-104.
84 94 S.Ct. at 1811 (footnote omitted). The legitimate justifications noted by the Court
are the traditional ones advanced by prison administrators in defending prison mail censorship. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049 (1972); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 783-84, 788 (D.R.I. 1970). See also
Stern, supra note 28, at 1006-12.
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sional opinion seems to be that restrictions on inmate mail retards
rather than advances rehabilitation. 5 Nevertheless, a regulation
authorizing mail censorship would be justified if prison authorities
could show that it was necessary to maintain institutional order or
security and was not simply a means of suppressing criticism 6 or
factually inaccurate statements.8 7 Yet, even if a regulation protects
one of the legitimate governmental interests,
it might still be in88
valid if its sweep is unnecessarily broad.
In applying this two-part test to California's mail regulations,
the Court determined that the prohibitions were unsupported by
any legitimate governmental interest.8 9 Additionally, the regulations were far broader than necessary to further the justifiable
needs of the penal authorities. 90
Although application of the O'Brien test would appear to have
the same effect as the reasonable and necessary test applied in
many recent lower court prisoners' rights cases, 91 the Court pur85 94 S. Ct. at 1811. It seems unlikely that prison officials will be able to demonstrate
that censorship aids the rehabilitative process, in light of the negative response censorship
has generated from the commentators. See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL

JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, Standard 2.17, at 66 (1973); Singer,

Censorship of Prisoners' Mail and the Constitution, 56 A.B.A.J. 1051, 1054 (1970); Stern, supra
note 28, at 1011.
It is interesting to note that Procunier did not even attempt to advance rehabilitation as
a justification for censorship. Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1096 n.5 (N.D. Cal.
1973).
88 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 788 (D.R.I. 1970); Carothers v.
Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
87 94 S. Ct. at 1811. See, e.g., Adams v. Carlson, 352 F. Supp. 882, 896 (E.D. Ill.), rev'd
on other grounds, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973).
88 94 S. Ct. at 1811. However, the Court provided for a certain amount of administrative discretion by recognizing that
[s]ome latitude in anticipating the probable consequences of allowing certain speech
in a prison environment is essential to the proper discharge of an administrator's
duty.
Id. at 1812.
89 Id.

9' Id. at 1813. The Court indicated that the concern for prison security did not justify
the application of the same restrictions to outgoing and incoming mail. Id. at 1813. Other
courts have recognized that outgoing mail presents little or no threat to prison security. See,
e.g., Guajardo v. McAdams, 349 F. Supp. 211, 219 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated & remanded on
other grounds sub nom. Sands v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S.
Ct. 2403 (1974); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 719 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom.
Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776,
791 (D.R.I. 1970).
91 In a prison context the O'Brien test has the same effect as the "reasonable and
necessary" test articulated in Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
and the "less drastic means" test. Compare notes 45-48 supra with note 82 supra.
Most of the recent lower court decisions regarding prison mail censorship have applied
the Carothers test or the "clear and present danger" test, also an element of Carothers. See 314
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posely avoided reliance on such decisions, a method of analysis
consistent with its refusal to approach the issue, from the standpoint of prisoners' rights. This approach severely limits the
decision's precedential value for other prison cases, a result the
Court clearly intended. Moreover, implicit in the adoption of the
O'Brien test is a judicial willingness to allow prison authorities to
continue reading all prison mail, a practice that most courts have
recognized as necessary 92 although it has not met with favorable
commentary. 93 Adoption of the O'Brien test does, however, represent the highest Court's decision to place the burden of justifying
mail censorship on prison authorities, adding one more prison
procedure to the growing list of practices for which they are
accountable.

94

As a final note on the mail censorship issue, the Court also
agreed with the lower court's holding that a decision to censor a
particular letter must be accompanied by minimum procedural
safeguards. 95 The district court found adequate safeguards to include notice of the disapproval of any letter, an opportunity to
contest the decision, and review of challenged censorship decisions
by an individual other than the person who initially disapproved
the letter. 9 6 The Court's affirmation of the district court's decision
F. Supp. at 1025. See, e.g., Le Mon v. Zelker, 358 F. Supp. 554, 556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 896 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319
F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
92 See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 201 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049 (1972); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1965). Contra, Brown v. Schubert,
347 F. Supp. 1232, 1234 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Jones v. wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 719 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
" See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS,
REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, Standard 2.17, at 66 (1973); Note, supra note 30, at 111.
" In addition to the noted decision, the Court heard a number of prisoners' rights
cases in its 1973-74 term. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974)
(setting standards for prison disciplinary proceedings); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 94 S.
Ct. 2811, 2815 (1974) (analyzing news media interviews in terms of the rights of newsmen);
Pell v. Procunier, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2806-10 (1974) (discussing prisoners' and newsmen's rights
to conduct interviews).
91 94 S. Ct. at 1814.
9' 354 F. Supp. at 1092, 1097. Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), was the
first case to consider what process is "due" when prison authorities seek to censor an
inmate's mail. Id. at 945. In Otis, prison officials sought to deny an inmate certain publications he had ordered. Id. at 941-42. Relying on standards established in Carothers v. Follette,
314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), for application to a prison disciplinary hearing, the Otis
court held that the rudimentary due process requirements of "(1) notice; (2) some opportunity to object . . . and (3) a decision by a body that can be expected to act fairly" must
accompany any decision to censor a prisoner's literature. 330 F. Supp. at 946.
Prison mail censorship represents a classic example of "prior restraint" which is presumptively invalid and bears a heavy burden of justification in non-prison settings. New
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flowed naturally from its analysis of the censorship issue. Since it
had determined that the "meshed" interest of an individual prisoner and his intended correspondent is grounded in the first
amendment, the Court felt compelled to require some form of due
process, as is necessary whenever a fourteenth amendment "lib97
erty" interest is denied by governmental action.
. The final issue the Procunier Court confronted was the absolute ban on the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to
conduct attorney-client interviews. 98 In evaluating this claim, the
district court had reasoned that since many of the inmates in
California prisons are indigent, a restriction on the use of lay
assistants should be analyzed from the standpoint of a prisoner's
right of access to the courts. 99 Recognizing that the Constitution
does not require that every procedure which complements access
to the courts be afforded to prisoners,t0 0 the lower court indicated
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). Due process requirements,

however, differ according to "the precise nature of the government function involved as well
as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." Cafeteria Local 473
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). Therefore, lower courts have generally been content
to apply minimum standards similar to those established in Otis when confronted with the
mail issue. See, e.g., Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (D.N.H. 1972); Lamar v.
Kern, 349 F. Supp. 222, 225 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
97 94 S. Ct. at 1814. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569
(1972). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
A perplexing problem remains in applying the Procunier Court's due process requirements. In response to the lower court's ruling, Procunier established new rules providing for
notice to the prisoner and an administrative review. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS,

RULES

AND

REGULATIONS

OF THE

DIRECTOR

OF

CORRECTIONS

DP-2409, DP-2410

(1974). Outgoing letters present no problem since they are returned to the inmate, but when
an incoming letter is rejected, the prisoner is given only the name of the sender and the
reason for rejection from a checklist of ten categories of forbidden mail. Id. An inherent
contradiction then arises-the prisoner has a right to protest the decision, however, he can
hardly make a compelling argument that a certain letter is not proscribed by the rules since
he has no idea what the letter contains.
This dilemma was resolved in Guajardo v. McAdams, 349 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Tex.
1972), vacated & remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sands v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 417 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2403 (1974), where the Texas Department of Corrections, in
response to an attack on its mail regulations, made provisions for the inmate to read the
censored material before arguing before a review committee. 349 F. Supp. at 214. This
procedure seems to defeat the purpose of censoring the material in the first place.
98 94 S. Ct. at 1814-15.
'9 354 F. Supp. at 1097-98.
l"' Id. at 1098. The lower court noted that the use of law students as aides to lawyers
has been approved by the American Bar Association. Id. (citing ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 3, EC 3-6 (1971)).

Many commentators have also recognized the beneficial effects of the use of law
students and paraprofessionals. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PERSPECTIVES ON PRISON

(1972);
Brickman, Expansion of the Lawyering Process Through a New Delivery System: The Emergence and
State of Legal Paraprofessionalism,71 COLUM. L. REV. 1153 (1971); Jacob & Sharma, Justice
LEGAL SERVICES: NEEDS, IMPACT AND THE POTENTIAL FOR LAw SCHOOL INVOLVEMENT
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that the standard to be applied was the balancing test previously
articulated in Gilmore v. Lynch, 1 0 ' which held that limits on legal
materials available in the prison law library denied prisoners
reasonable access to the courts.1 0 2 Gilmore required that prison
rules must pass the test of due process reasonableness, that test
varying "according to the character of the right taken from the
10 3
prisoner."
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's disposition,
basing its decision on the lower court's finding that the contested
restrictions infringed upon an indigent inmate's access to the
courts.' 0

4

Citing Ex parte Hull'0 5 for the proposition that regula-

tions unjustifiably restricting access to the courts are invalid,' 0 6 the
Court reasoned that its decision in Johnson v. Avery 10 7 was
controlling.' 0 In Johnson, the Court invalidated a Tennessee prison
regulation prohibiting inmates from assisting each other in the
preparation of legal papers.' 0 9 The Court held that until the state
provided some reasonable alternative legal assistance, any absolute
prohibition on 'jail house lawyers" was unjustified."1 Although the
precise issue of granting law students and paraprofessionals access
to the prisons does not appear to have been previously litigated, 1 1 '
the Court's decision is consonant with prior decisions liberally protecting access to the courts.1 12 Nevertheless, it should be noted that
the Court's disposition of the issue implied that regulations short of
13
an absolute ban could easily be justified.'
After Trial: Prisoners'Needfor Legal Services inthe Criminal-CorrectionalProcess, 18 KAN. L. REv.
493 (1970).
101 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15
(1971).
'02 354 F. Supp. at 1098 (citing Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 109 n.6 (N.D. Cal.
1970), aff'd sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971)).
10'319 F. Supp. at 109 n.6. The Procunier district court also relied on a California
supreme court case which held that when examining restrictions on an inmate's access to the
courts it must " 'measure the extent of restriction against the need for restriction.' " 354 F.
Supp. at 1098 (quoting from In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 686, 470 P.2d 640, 646, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 504, 510 (1970)) (emphasis in original).
104 94 S. Ct. at 1814. See 354 F. Supp. at 1097-99.
105 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
106 94 S. Ct. at 1814.
107 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
101 94 S. Ct. at 1815.
109 393 U.S. at 490.
110 Id.
"I But cf Doe v. Bell, 1 PRISON L. RPTR. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Campbell v. Rogers, 1
PRISON L. RPTR. 60, 99, 278 (D.D.C. 1971). See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 489
(1969).
Il
See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
113 94 S. Ct. at 1815. The Court implied that much weight should be given to prison
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The Procunier decision indicates a willingness by the Court to
subject prison officials' regulations to close judicial scrutiny and
require justifications for those regulations, a process that has only
recently been applied to a prison environment. The decision does
not, however, fully settle the issue of prison mail regulations. For
instance, prison authorities remain free to read prisoners' mail with
abandon."1 4 As Justice Marshall pointed out in his concurring
opinion, this practice is not only unnecessary, but also creates a
"chilling effect" on inmate correspondence." 5
Moreover, reading an inmate's mail does not meet the requirements of the Court's own test, since less restrictive means of
meeting the legitimate needs of the prison authorities are
available."t 6 Justice Marshall suggested that fluoroscoping or inspecting mail without readirng it would satisfy concerns about contraband, and fears of escape plans being hatched through the mails
could be alleviated by a policy of reading mail only when authorities have reason to believe such a plot is in the planning." l7
Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how the articulated
legitimate interests of order and security justify reading all outgoing mail. Surely, there can be no threat to internal order in a letter
leaving the prison,'" 8 and as Justice Marshall noted, the argument
officials' expertise and authority in weighing restrictions on persons allowed in the institution. Id. Furthermore, if authorities could show that access to the prison by law students and
paraprofessionals placed an undue burden on their security system, they would be justified
in not implementing them. Id. Illustrative of restrictions that can survive judicial scrutiny is
the final order of the district court which the Supreme Court approved by implication. Id.
That order is quite narrow, requiring certification of the students and paraprofessionals and
sponsorship by the attorney-of-record. Appellants' Reply Brief at 6, Procunier v. Martinez,
94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974).
"4 Concomitant with the reading of prisoners' letters is a restriction on the number of
persons an inmate can have on his approved mailing list, since an unlimited number of
correspondents would overwhelm the censors. Such limitations are common and have often
been approved by the courts. See, e.g., Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972-73 (8th Cir. 1965);
Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805, 810 (W.D. Mo. 1968). The new rules of the California
Department of Corrections permit each institution to limit the number of correspondents as
"necessary." STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DFP'T OF CORRECTIONS, RULES AND REGULATIONS
OF THE

DP-2403(10) (1974).
11
94 S. Ct. at 1817 (Marshall, J., concurring). The opportunity to retaliate against
a
prisoner who uses the mails to criticize his keepers is only too evident to the inmate.
Prisoners have often been severely punished for criticism discovered in their letters. See, e.g.,
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1021-22,(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Cf Sostre v. Rockefeller,
312 F. Supp. 863, 867-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 690
(E.D. Ark. 1965).
116 See Note, supra note 30, at 100 n.81.
1 94 S. Ct. at 1817 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp.
392, 395 (D. Mass. 1971); Stern, supra note 28, at 1026.
"' See cases cited in note 90 supra.
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NOTES

that outgoing mail may contain schemes threatening security is
undermined by the practice of allowing unmonitored visitations
where such plans could be much more effectively plotted.1 19
Probably the most significant aspect of the Court's opinion is
the limited manner in which it analyzed the mail censorship issue,
carefully avoiding any expansion of prisoners' constitutional
rights. 120 This analysis leaves open the question of what standard
to apply when one prisoner wishes to correspond with another
prisoner. 12' But more importantly, there seems to be little
justification for this approach in light of the universal condemnation that prison mail restrictions have generated from
commentators, 1 2 2 as well as the demonstrated judicial ability to
accord certain first amendment rights to prisoners without any
concomitant decline in the efficient administration of the
prisons.1 23 Furthermore, the Court's refusal to reach and decide
the issue of the extent to which a prisoner retains his first amendment rights is an open invitation to future litigation,1 2 4 continuing
the federal courts' involvement in the affairs of the prisons-one of
the very things the Court sought to avoid-and leaving still unanin
swered the question of whether the full panoply of protections
1 25
portals.
prison
the
behind
retained
are
amendment
first
the
John Micheal Donnelly
"l9

94 S. Ct. at 1817. See Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 791 (D.R.I. 1970).

120 Justice Powell, who wrote the majority opinion, recently expressed his view that

inmates have no personal constitutional rights to participate in interviews with reporters. Pell
v. Procunier, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2811 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
This case demonstrates that the Procunier decision is a double-edged sword. Part of the
reasoning behind the PelU Court's limitation on the right of the press to interview inmates
was that the inmates already had ample means to communicate with the outside world by
virtue of the Procunier decision. Id. at 2805.
121 This precise issue has often been the subject of litigation. See, e.g., Wilkerson v.
Warden, 465 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1972); Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
'21 See note 85 supra.
23 The free exercise clause of the first amendment

has long been recognized as
applicable to the prisons. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
124 The applicability of the free expression and assembly provisions of the first amendment is certain to be the subject of future litigation as it has been in the past. See, e.g.,
Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972); Lamar v. Coffield, 353 F. Supp. 1081
(S.D. Tex. 1972).
1'2 Lower courts often reiterate the view expressed in Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228,
1230 (4th Cir. 1971), that a prisoner does not lose all of his first amendment rights at the
prison gates. See, e.g., Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062, 1065 (10th
Cir. 1973); Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 941, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). However, exactly which
first amendment rights an inmate retains has never been fully settled.

